We improve the robustness of deep neural nets to adversarial attacks by using an interpolating function as the output activation. This data-dependent activation remarkably improves both generalization and robustness towards adversarial attacks. In the CIFAR10 benchmark, we raise the accuracy of the Projected Gradient Descent adversarial training from ∼ 46% to ∼ 69% for ResNet20. When we combine this data-dependent activation with total variation minimization on adversarial images and training data augmentation, we achieve an improvement in accuracy by 38.9% for ResNet56 under the strongest attack of the Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method. We further provide an intuitive explanation of our defense by analyzing the geometry of the feature space. For reproducibility, the code is made available at: https://github.com/BaoWangMath/DNN-DataDependentActivation.
Introduction
The adversarial vulnerability [34] of deep neural nets (DNN) threatens their applicability in security critical tasks, e.g., autonomous cars [1] , robotics [11] , DNN-based malware detection systems [26, 10] . Since the pioneering work by Szegedy et al. [34] , many advanced adversarial attack schemes have been devised to generate imperceptible perturbations to sufficiently fool the DNN [9, 25, 7, 37, 14, 4, 8] . Not only are adversarial attacks successful in white-box attacks, i.e., when the adversary has access to the DNN's parameters, but they are also successful in black-box attacks, i.e., without access to network parameters. Adversarial attacks are transferable in the sense that a perturbed image meant to be misclassified by one DNN also has a significant chance to be misclassified by another DNN [28] . Due to this transferability, it is adversaries can attack neural nets without knowing the network parameters (i.e. blackbox) [19, 6] . There even exist universal perturbations that can imperceptibly perturb any image and cause misclassification for any given network [22] . And recently, there has been much work on defending against these universal perturbations [2]. 1 arXiv:1809.08516v2 [cs. LG] 27 Nov 2018
In this work, we defend against adversarial attacks by changing the DNN's output activation to a manifold-interpolating function in order to seamlessly utilize the training data to perform inference. By combining our defense with the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [21] adversarial training, total variation minimization (TVM), and training data augmentation, we show state-ofthe-art results for the CIFAR10 benchmark.
Related Work
Defensive distillation was recently proposed to increase the stability of DNN [27] , and a related approach [35] cleverly modifies the training data to increase robustness against black-box attacks and adversarial attacks in general. To counter adversarial perturbations, Guo et al. [12] , propose to use image transformation, e.g., bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, TVM, and image quilting. A similar idea of denoising the input was later explored in [23] , where the authors divide the input into patches, denoise each patch, and then reconstruct the image. These input transformations are intended to be non-differentiable, thus making adversarial attacks more difficult, especially for gradient-based attacks. Another denoising approach is introduced by Liao et al. [18] , where they propose a high-level representation guided (HGD) denoiser -the idea is that while perturbations seem small in the original and adversarial images, these perturbations are amplified in higher representations. Transformation-based defenses have also been proposed by Xie et al. [38] , and Luo et al. [20] . Song et al. [33] , noticed that small adversarial perturbations shift the distribution of adversarial images far from the distribution of clean images. Therefore, they proposed to purify the adversarial images by PixelDefend. And Prakash et al. [29] , also seek to examine image statistics in order to construct an adversarial defense -in their work, they introduce Pixel Deflection where they force images to match statistics of natural images. Lee et al. [17] , have also used the distribution of images to detect adversarial examples. Adversarial training is another family of defense methods to enhance the stability of DNNs [9, 21, 24] . In particular, the PGD adversarial training achieves state-of-the-art resistance to the available attacks [21] . GANs are also employed for adversarial defense [31] . In [3] , the authors proposed an approximated gradient to attack the defenses that are based on the obfuscated gradient.
Instead of using the softmax function as DNN's output activation, Wang et al. [36] , utilize a class of non-parametric interpolating functions. This is a combination of both deep and manifold learning which causes the DNN to utilize the geometric information of the training data sufficiently. The authors show a significant amount of generalization accuracy improvement, and the results are more stable when one only has a limited amount of training data.
DNN with Data-Dependent Activation
In this section, we summarize the architecture, training, and testing procedures of the DNN with the data-dependent activation [36] . For the standard DNN with softmax activation, the training and testing are shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), respectively. In the kth iteration of training, given a mini-batch of training data X, Y, we perform:
Forward propagation: Transform X into features by the DNN block (a combination of convolutional layers, nonlinearities, etc.), and then feed the output into the softmax activation to obtain the predictionsỸ, i.e.,
Then the loss is computed (e.g., cross entropy) between Y andỸ: L . = L Linear = Loss(Y,Ỹ). Backpropagation: Update weights (Θ k−1 , W k−1 ) by gradient descent with learning rate γ
Once the model is optimized, with optimal parameters being (Θ, W), the predicted labels for testing data X areỸ = Softmax(DNN(X, Θ), W).
Wang et al [36] proposed to replace the data-agnostic softmax by an interpolating function defined below. 
Manifold Interpolation -A Harmonic Extension Approach
te m } ("te" for template) be a subset of X which are labeled with label function g(x). We want to interpolate a function u that is defined on M and can be used to label the entire dataset X. The harmonic extension is a natural approach to find such an interpolating function, which is defined by minimizing the following Dirichlet energy functional
with the boundary condition
where w(x, y) is a weight function, chosen to be Gaussian:
) with σ being a scaling parameter. The Euler-Lagrange equation for Eq. (1) is
By solving the linear system Eq. (2), we obtain labels u(x) for the unlabeled data x ∈ X/X te . This interpolation becomes invalid when the labeled data is tiny, i.e., |X te | |X/X te |. To resolve this issue, the weights of the labeled data is increased in the Euler-Lagrange equation, which gives
x ∈ X te .
The solution to Eq. (3) is named weighted nonlocal Laplacian (WNLL), denoted as WNLL(X, X te , Y te ). Shi et al. [32] , showed that WNLL converges to the solution of the high dimensional LaplaceBeltrami equation. For classification, g(x) is the one-hot label for the example x.
Training and Testing of the DNN with Data-Dependent Activation Function
For a standard neural net N, we denote the WNLL activated one as N-WNLL, e.g., the WNLL activated ResNet20 is named ResNet20-WNLL. In both training and testing of the DNN-WNLL, we need to reserve a small portion of data/label pairs, denoted as (X te , Y te ), to interpolate the label for new data. We name the reserved data (X te , Y te ) as the template. Directly replacing softmax by WNLL has difficulties in back propagation, namely the true gradients Fig. 1 (c)) are difficult to compute since WNLL defines an implicit function. Instead, to train the DNN-WNLL, a proxy via an auxiliary neural nets ( Fig. 1(c) ) is employed. On top of the original DNN, we add a buffer block (a fully connected layer followed by a ReLU), and followed by two parallel branches, WNLL and the linear (fully connected) layers. The auxiliary DNN can be trained by alternating between training the DNN with linear and WNLL activations, respectively. The training loss of the WNLL activation is backpropped via a straight-through gradient estimator [3, 5] , e.g., in the kth iteration, we use the following approximated gradient descent to update W B only (when backpropagating the training loss L WNLL we freeze the remaining part except the buffer block),
where
is the loss computed through the computation graphs of the two different activation. In the approximation of Eq. (4), we simply change the value of L Linear to that of L WNLL . At test time, we remove the linear classifier from the neural nets and use the DNN and buffer blocks together with WNLL to classify new data ( Fig. 1 (d) ); here for simplicity, we merge the buffer block to the DNN block. For a given set of testing data X, and the labeled template {(X te , Y te )}, the predicted labels for X is given bỹ
Adversarial Attacks
We consider three benchmark attacks: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [9] , Iterative FGSM (IFGSM) [16] , and Carlini-Wagner's L 2 (CW-L2) [7] attack. We denote the classifier defined by the DNN asỹ = f (θ, x) for a given instance (x, y). FGSM searchs the adversarial image x with a bounded perturbation by maximizing the loss L(x , y) . = L(f (θ, x ), y), subject to the l ∞ perturbation constraint ||x − x|| ∞ ≤ with being the attack strength. We can approximately solve this constrained optimization problem by using the first order approximation of the loss function i.e.,
. Under this approximation, the optimal adversarial image is
IFGSM iterates FGSM to generate the enhanced attack, i.e.,
, with M be the number of iterations. Both FGSM and IFGSM belong to fix-perturbation attacks. Moreover, we consider a zeroconfidence attack due to Carlini and Wagner. For a given image-label pair (x, y), and ∀t = y, CW-L2 searches the adversarial image that will be classified to class t by solving the optimization problem
subject to
where δ is the adversarial perturbation (for simplicity, we ignore the dependence of θ in f ). The equality constraint in Eq. (7) is hard to handle, so Carlini et al. consider the surrogate
where Z(x) is the logit vector for an input x, i.e., output of the neural nets before the output layer. Z(x) i is the logit value corresponding to class i. It is easy to see that f (x + δ) = t is equivalent to g(x + δ) ≤ 0. Therefore, the problem in Eq. (7) can be reformulated as
where c ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier. By letting δ = 
The Adam optimizer [15] can solve this unconstrained optimization problem efficiently. All three attacks clip the values of the adversarial image x to between 0 and 1.
In practice, we apply the following clipped IFGSM
where α is an additional parameter to be specified in the following experiments.
Attack the DNN with WNLL Activation
For a given mini-batch of testing images (X, Y) and template (X te , Y te ), we denote the DNN-WNLL asỸ = WNLL(Z({X, X te }), Y te ), where Z({X, X te }) is the composition of the DNN and buffer blocks as shown in Fig. 1(c) . By ignoring dependence of the loss function on the parameters, the loss function for DNN-WNLL can be written asL(X, Y, X te , Y te ) . = Loss(Ŷ, Y). The above attacks for DNN-WNLL are formulated below.
• IFGSM
where m = 1, 2, · · · , N ; X (0) = X and X = X (N ) .
• CW-L2
where i are the logit values of the input images X, t are the target labels.
In the above attacks, ∇ XL is required to generate the adversarial images. In the DNN-WNLL, this gradient is difficult to compute. As shown in Fig. 1 (c) , we approximate ∇ XL in the following way
again, in the above approximation, we set the value of L Linear to the value ofL. Based on our numerical experiments, the batch size of X has minimal influence on the adversarial attack and defense. In all of our experiments, we choose the size of both mini-batches X and the template to be 500.
Defense by Interpolating Function, TVM, and Training Data Augmentation
To defend against adversarial attacks, we first combine the data-dependent activation with input transformation and with training data augmentation. We train ResNet56 [13] and ResNet56-WNLL, respectively, on the original training data, the TV minimized training data, and a combination of the previous two. Moreover, in testing, we apply the TVM [30] used by [12] , with the same setting, to transform the adversarial images to boost classification performance. The basic idea of TVM is to reconstruct the simplest image z from the sub-sampled image, X x with X the mask filled by a Bernoulli binary random variable, by solving
where λ T V > 0 is the regularization constant. We apply the three attack schemes mentioned above to attack ResNet56 and ResNet56-WNLL. For IFGSM, we run 10 iterations of Eqs. (6) and (13) with α = 0.1 to attack the DNN with two different output activations, respectively. For the CW-L2 attack (Eqs. (10, 14) ), in both scenarios we set the parameters c = 10 and κ = 0, and run 10 iterations of the Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.01. Figure 2 depicts three randomly selected images (horse, automobile, airplane) from the CIFAR10 dataset, as well as the perturbed images from applying different attacks on ResNet56 and ResNet56-WNLL, and the TV minimized ones. All attacks successfully fool the classifiers to classify any of them correctly. Figure 2 (a) shows that the perturbations resulted from FGSM attack with = 0.02 is almost imperceptible. However, both FGSM and IFGSM attacks are powerful in fooling DNNs. Figure 2 (b) shows the corresponding images of (a) with a stronger attack, = 0.08. With a larger , the adversarial images become more noisy. The TV minimized images of Fig. 2 (a) and (b) are shown in Fig. 2 (c) and (d) , respectively. TVM removes a significant amount of information from the original and the adversarial images. Meanwhile, it also makes it harder for humans to classify them. 6 
Numerical Results

Transferability of the Adversarial Images
We utilize the training strategy used in [36] to train the neural nets. To test the transferability, we classify the adversarial images by using ResNet56 with the opponent activation. We list the mutual classification accuracy on adversarial images resulting from using FGSM or IFGSM in Table. 1. The adversarial images crafted by attacking ResNet56 with two types of activation functions are both transferable, as the mutual classification accuracy on adversarial images ( = 0) is significantly lower than testing on the clean images ( = 0). For both FGSM and IFGSM, the stronger attack (in the sense of bigger ) is adapted to the opponent activation function, as the mutual classification accuracy decreases dramatically as increases. IFGSM not only fools its underlying model completely, but also significantly decreases the accuracy of the opponent neural nets. The mutual classification results for the CW-L2 attack is shown in Table. 2, where Exp-I denotes classifying adversarial images resulted from attacking ResNet56-WNLL by ResNet56, and Exp-II denotes the opposite. Training data augmentation can defend CW-L2 attack very effectively. Figure 3 plots the results of adversarial defense by combining the WNLL activation, TVM, and training data augmentation. Panels (a) and (b) show the testing accuracy of ResNet56 with and without defense on CIFAR10 data for FGSM and IFGSM, respectively. It is seen that as increases, the testing accuracy decreases rapidly. FGSM is a relatively weak attack, and the accuracy remains above 20.5% even with the most potent attack ( = 0.1). Meanwhile, the defense raises the accuracy to 43.7%. Figure 3 (b) shows that IFGSM fools ResNet56 near completely even with = 0.2. The defense maintains the accuracy above 38.5%, 54.5% under the CW-L2 and IFGSM attacks, respectively (see Tables. 3 and 4) . Compared to the state-of-the-art defensive methods on CIFAR10, PixelDefend, our approach is much simpler and faster. Without adversarial training, we have shown our defense is more robust to FGSM and IFGSM attacks under the strongest attack than PixelDefend [33] . Moreover, our defense strategy is additive to adversarial training and many other defenses including PixelDefend.
Adversarial Defense
To analyze the contribution from each component of the defensive strategy, we separate the three parts and list the testing accuracy in Tables. 3 and 4 . Performing TVM on the adversarial images cannot defend FGSM attacks except when the training data contains the TV minimized images. For instance, when we attack the model by FGSM with = 0.02, the accuracy on the adversarial images for ResNet56 and ResNet56-WNLL are 36.9% and 58.5%, respectively, provided the models are trained on the original training data. The accuracy reduces to 19.4% and 26.0% when testing on the TV minimized adversarial images. For ResNet56, the accuracy raises to 50.4% and 51.1% when the model is trained on the TVM and augmented data, respectively. For ResNet-WNLL, the accuracy increases to 52.6% and 55.4%, respectively. The WNLL activation improves testing accuracy of adversarial attacks significantly and persistently. Augmented training can also improve the stability consistently.
IFGSM fools the ResNet56-WNLL near completely, as the accuracy is always less than or close to 1%. These results verify the efficacy of using the approximated gradient, i.e., Eq. (15), in attacking the neural nets.
Analysis of the Geometry of Features
We consider features' geometry of the original and adversarial images. We randomly select 1000 training and 100 testing images from the airplane and automobile classes, respectively. We apply two visualization strategies for ResNet56: (1) Apply the principle component analysis (PCA) to reduce the 64D features from the layer before the softmax to 2D, and (2) we add a 2 by 2 fully connected (FC) layer before the softmax, then utilize the 2D features output from this newly added layer; we verify that the newly added layer does not change the performance of ResNet56, as shown in Fig. 4 , and the training and testing performance remains essentially the same. Figure 5 (a) and (b) show the 2D features generated by ResNet56 with the additional FC layer for the original and adversarial testing images, respectively, where we generate the adversarial images by using FGSM ( = 0.02). Before adversarial perturbation (Fig. 5 (a) ), there is a line that can separate the two classes very well. The small perturbation mixes the features and there is no linear classifier that can easily separate these two classes (Fig. 5 (b) ). The first two principle components (PCs) of the 64D features of the clean and adversarial images are shown in Fig. 5 (c) and (d) , respectively. Again, the PCs are well separated for clean images, while adversarial images causes overlap.
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where L is the loss of the prediction by DNN + Linear blocks w.r.t the ground truth labels Y i .
Backpropagate the classification error of the adversarial images. //PGD adversarial training of the right branch: DNN with WNLL activation. Split (X, Y) into training data and template, i.e., (X, Y) . Backpropagate the classification error of the adversarial images.
same, as illustrated in panels (e) and (f). The new features are better separated which indicates that DNN-WNLL are more accurate and more robust to small random perturbation. Panels (g) and (h) plot the features of the adversarial and TV minimized adversarial images in the test set. The adversarial attacks make the features move towards each other and TVM helps to eliminate the outliers. Based on our computation, the interpolating function on features shown in panels (g) and (h) are significantly more accurate than the softmax classifier as shown in panel (d). The fact that the adversarial perturbations change the features' distribution was also noticed in [33] , and [18] .
PGD Adversarial Training with Data-Dependent Activation Function
Image transformation based adversarial defense has been broken recently by circumventing the obfuscated gradient [3] . To train a neural nets that is most resistant to adversarial attacks, Madry et al. [21] , incorporate the adversarial perturbation into the empirical risk function
, where D is the collection of the pairs of training images and labels, and θ represents the parameters of the neural nets. The idea of PGD adversarial training is that instead of feeding samples from D directly into the loss L, we use the adversary to perturb the input first, and then we end up with the following saddle point problem
where δ is the adversarial perturbation. To make the problem (Eq. (16)) solvable, the interior maximization problem is relaxed to a strong adversarial attack, say IFGSM. It is argued in [3] , that PGD adversarial training achieves the best resistance to adversarial attacks for CIFAR10 classification. We extend the PGD adversarial training to DNN-WNLL by applying the approximated gradient, Eq. (15), to approximately resolve the interior maximization problem. We summarize the PGD adversarial training of DNN-WNLL in Algorithm 1.
Numerical Results
We consider PGD adversarial training, respectively, for the ResNet20 and ResNet20-WNLL. Again, we train the ResNet20 with two types of activation, where we follow the strategy used in [36] , and where all the hyper-parameters in Algorithm 1 are referred. To approximate max δ∈S L(θ, x + δ, y), we apply the IFGSM attack with α = 8/255 in Eqs. (11, 13) . First, we fixed the attack strength = 1/255 and vary the number of IFGSM iterations. As shown in Fig. 6 (a) , the accuracy of ResNet20 with both activations decreases as the number of iteration increases. The vanilla ResNet20's accuracy decays much faster than the ResNet20-WNLL. The difference is ∼ 23% when 10 iterations of IFGSM is applied. Second, we fixed the IFGSM iteration to be 10 and vary from 0 to 8/255 with step size 1/255. As shown in Fig. 6  (b) , for different nonzero attack strengths, PGD adversarial training of the ResNet20-WNLL has ∼ 23% higher accuracy than the vanilla one consistently.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, by analyzing the influence of adversarial perturbations on the geometric structure of the DNN's features, we propose to defend against adversarial attacks by using a datadependent activation function. We further show our defenses are additive to other defenses, namely total variation minimization, training data augmentation, and projected gradient descent adversarial training. Results on ResNet20 and ResNet56 with CIFAR10 benchmark reveal that these defenses improve robustness to adversarial perturbation significantly. Total variation minimization simplifies the adversarial images, which is very useful in removing adversarial perturbation. The data-dependent activation framework raises the accuracy of PGD adversarial training around 23% under different attack strengths. An interesting direction to explore is to combine these methods with other denoising methods to remove adversarial perturbation. 
